

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

19 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 19 June 1969

The Director opened by calling Carver's attention to press coverage of former Secretary of Defense Clifford's remarks on Vietnam.

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Godfrey called attention to the heavy attack around Tay Ninh City and commented that there is some evidence that the City itself had been penetrated.

[] noted that he anticipates no major problems with the two Estimates scheduled for consideration by USIB today: NIE 52-69, The Outlook for Thailand, and NIE 11-1-69, The Soviet Space Program.

[] recalled that next Monday was tentatively set as the date for a USIB meeting to consider revisions of the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8-68. The Director noted that the meeting should be scheduled at the DDCI's convenience.

[] called attention to a recent DIA briefing on the Sino-Soviet situation. He noted his understanding that the briefing was given only to General Wheeler and suggested that the briefing would be of considerable interest to the ONE staff. Considerable discussion followed, and the Director observed that it would be a good idea for the ONE staff and DIA to get together on this matter.


Carver noted that he will be seeing Secretary Laird at 10 a.m. this morning.

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


Godfrey noted receipt of a call from Mr. Fezio in Colonel Haig's office conveying a request from Dr. Kissinger for our views on whether the magnitude of enemy withdrawals in the I Corps area is related in any way to the U. S. announcement of the withdrawal of 25,000 troops. The Director cautioned against trying to make these judgments at this time.

Maury mentioned receipt of a call from George Murphy of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy staff asking whether there is any atomic energy Restricted Data in the Estimate which is the topic of current press reports. DD/S&T stated that NIE 11-8-68 did contain such Data, none of which has as yet appeared in the press. The Director asked Maury to advise Mr. Murphy that the Estimate is still being processed and that he will receive a copy in due course.

Houston briefed on a White House request for data pertaining to foreign funding of the SDS. DDCI noted receipt of a similar inquiry from Colonel Hughes. The Director asked that DDP/CI, brief Tom Houston of the White House staff on this matter.

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DD/P noted Saigon 0197, reporting that Ambassador Bunker has advised that the American civilian establishment in Vietnam will be reviewed, with a target reduction of 25 percent.

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The Director noted that he has asked Bruce Clarke to get in touch with Secretary Laird's staff assistant in connection with their scheduled joint appearance in executive session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday.

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The Director complimented the drafters of his briefing on "verification" for the NSC meeting. DD/I commented that it was primarily the work of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] noted receipt of two telephone calls, one from the Baltimore Sun and the other from the AP, requesting information on the ABM controversy. Both requests were turned down.

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[REDACTED]
L. K. White

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NEW YORK TIMES
19 JUN 1969

Nixon and National Security Council Confer on Arms Talks With the Russians

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 18—President Nixon and the National Security Council began their long-scheduled discussion today on the United States negotiating position for arms-limitations talks with the Soviet Union. They apparently reached no firm decisions about date, place or content of the negotiations.

After an unusually long morning meeting—more than two and a half hours—Administration spokesmen moved to check expectations of any immediate approach to the Russians.

With at least one more full-dress meeting of the council scheduled, and consultations with the European allies to be completed, White House officials said that a decision about how to get the delayed talks started might not come for two more weeks.

The content and the timing of the talks have become embroiled in controversy between the Administration and its critics on Capitol Hill.

There was little detectable sentiment among top Administration officials in favor of a proposal by 39 Senators yesterday for a halt in Soviet and American testing, of multiple-warhead missiles as the first item for the talks.

Want Focus First

On the contrary, the Administration appears to favor postponing any discussion of the more advanced strategic arms, including antiballistic missiles, until the talks have focused on weapons systems already deployed.

On this reasoning, security council members have proposed that a "freeze" of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, in which the United States and Soviet Union have approximate parity, be the first matter on the agenda.

The date for opening the talks has domestic political repercussions. Much of the Congressional sentiment in opposition to the proposed Safeguard antiballistic missile system is linked to impatience at the seeming delay in opening a new round of major disarmament discussions.

Administration strategists have hoped to announce an opening session well before the ABM issue comes up for a Senate vote. With an extremely close vote on this issue expected by both sides, the opening of the arms talks earlier might well swing a few votes over to the pro-ABM position.

Yesterday, the Senate leadership postponed the opening of debate on the ABM issue until after the July 4 recess, taking some of the political pressure off the Administration to reach a quick decision on an opening date.

The further council meetings implied by White House officials seemed to throw into doubt the timetable given by Secretary of State William P. Rogers at a news conference two weeks ago.

Although it was always intended that the Security Council would need several meetings to define a full negotiating position, Mr. Rogers had implied that the meeting today would be decisive, at least on the question of timing.

Mr. Rogers raised the subject of timing in general terms with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, a week ago just before the envoy returned to Moscow for consultations. Reportedly, he mentioned July 31 as a possibility.

Other United States officials were dubious that this was realistic, considering the decisions and diplomatic preparation required. Their skepticism was only increased today.

Clifford Asks Viet Phaseout

Would Remove Ground Troops By End of '70

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Defense Secretary

Clark M. Clifford called yesterday for the pullout of all American ground troops from Vietnam by the end of next year, starting with "about 100,000" troops this year.

In an article in Foreign Affairs magazine subtitled "The Personal History of One Man's View and How It Evolved" during the Johnson Administration from Vietnam hawk to dove, Clifford recommended that:

- The troop pullout order should be passed to the South Vietnamese so they would have no doubt that the initial 100,000 withdrawal was "the beginning of a process" leading to total ground combat withdrawal.

- Orders should be issued to American military commanders "to discontinue efforts to apply maximum military pressure on the enemy and to seek instead to reduce the level of combat."

- While American combat troops are being withdrawn, the United States should continue to provide the South Vietnamese armed forces "with logistic support and with our air resources." Eventual withdrawal of these forces would be "determined on the basis of political and military developments."

Sees "Painful Dilemma"

Clifford argued that the results of such an American policy would be to:

- Confront the North Vietnamese leaders with "a painful dilemma," either the prospect "of a prolonged and substantial presence of American air and logistical personnel

to support the South Vietnamese or the alternative of agreeing, "tacitly or explicitly," on a mutual withdrawal of all external forces.

In either eventuality, wrote Clifford, "the resulting balance of forces should avert any danger of a blood bath which some fear might occur in the aftermath of our withdrawal."

- Force the Saigon government to "recognize, probably for the first time, that American objectives do not demand the perpetuation in power of any one group of South Vietnamese." Thus pressure would be "applied" on the regime headed by President Thieu to make room "for individuals representative of other nationalist elements in South Vietnamese society."

Sees No Adverse Effect

Clifford said he felt his proposals, if carried out, would have no adverse effect on the Paris peace talks but rather bring about "true bargaining."

"The one million South Vietnamese in the various components of the armed forces," wrote Clifford, "with American logistics, air lift and air support, should be able, if they have the will, to prevent the imposition by force of a Hanoi-controlled regime. If they lack a sense or a sufficiency of national purpose, we can never force it on them."

Clifford's article was written before President Nixon, at the June 8 Midway meeting with Thieu, announced the withdrawal of 25,000 American troops and hinted that more will be pulled out later this year. However, Administration officials have indicated a much more cautious approach to withdrawal than that urged by Clifford.

Clifford's law office said that yesterday he had sent advance copies of his article to White House, State Department and Pentagon officials.

Most of the former Defense Secretary's account of the evolution of his own thinking both before and after he took office is well known and has been widely printed.

However, this is the first time Clifford has told the story on the record. But Clifford avoided any reference to

the coolness that developed in men and material; we were between him and President to devise the means by which Johnson last year as Clifford they could be provided." Clifford pressed his strong public criticism of the Thieu government and for a pullout of American forces.

The key points in the Clifford account are these:

Just before President Kennedy was inaugurated, Clifford, as his note taker at a meeting with President Eisenhower, quotes the outgoing Chief Executive as saying that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. Eisenhower said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the area.

Clifford quotes Kennedy's public statement that withdrawal from Vietnam and Thailand "could mean the collapse of the whole area." Clifford says of President Kennedy, "He never wavered."

In 1967 Clifford was sent by President Johnson along with Gen. Maxwell Taylor to visit the Asian allies involved in the Vietnam war "to discuss with them the possibility of their increasing their troop commitments." (At the time, however, Clifford and the Johnson Administration both denied that more troops were being requested.)

Clifford's "high hopes" for more troops from Australia and New Zealand were disappointed. He returned from the trip "puzzled, troubled, concerned." It was this attitude of the allies which created his first "nagging" doubts about the validity of the war. These doubts were "dramatized" by the refusal of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew to send any men to Vietnam.

"Varying interpretations" by Administration officials of President Johnson's San Antonio peace formula raised the question in Clifford's mind "as to whether all of us had the same objective in view." But he avoided identifying those with differing views.

Clifford also states that in his first assignment by President Johnson on becoming Defense Secretary the task force he was named to chair was "not instructed to assess the need for substantial increases

Clifford concluded that this would require a reserve callup of some 280,000, a war budget increase of \$10 billion to \$12 billion for Fiscal 1969 and the "possibility" of credit restrictions, a tax increase and "even wage and price controls." Furthermore the balance of payments problem would be at least half a billion worse.